expressed in different languages and terminology, is as potent today as it was twenty-four hundred years ago. Epilepsy, Hippocrates almost shouted, is not a "sacred disease," but a natural one. The word "sacred" is now forgotten and "psychological" has taken its place; the word "natural" has been supplanted by "organic."
This implied conflict still persists in all its essentials. Hippocrates fought against the mystic templar tradition. The scientific struggle continues now between two branches of medicine. The occasional thrusts made against the Church and Christianity, or against religion in general, as the supposed chief agent responsible for extreme psychological orientations, are only partially correct, if correct at all. The struggle originated by Hippocrates was acute centuries before the advent of Christ, and over a millennium before the so-called Dark Ages. It is doubtful whether the conflict between medicine and psychiatry in the Middle Ages and during the greater part of the Renaissance was due primarily to the established Christian theology. The constant, hair-splitting argumentation of the Middle Ages, which sought to establish a differential diagnosis between "natural" and "supernatural" diseases, in no way differed in its substance from the corresponding attitude which Hippocrates brought into focus when he wrote his treatise on The Sacred Disease.
It is quite obvious that we deal here with a fundamental problem which transgresses the confines of a given historical period and of a given set of cultural conditions. One is led rather forcibly to the suspicion that we are dealing here with a certain limitation of man's *The Beaumont Lecture on Medical History, delivered before the Beaumont Medical Club, New Haven, Connecticut, April 29, 1942. YALU JOURNAL OF BIOLOGY AND MBDICINE, VOL. 16, NO. 3. psychological, or intellectual, horizon, a limitation difficuit if not impossible fully to overcome, and one in extreme need of proper clarification. One need not be deterred from investigating this phenomenon merely because it points to something man cannot do or penetrate. There are many things which are beyond our direct apprehension, yet we have found highly serviceable scientific ways of dealing with them.
The question before us at the present moment is not what epistemological and metaphysical problems are involved in the conflict between the organicist and the psychologist, but rather a descriptive survey of what this struggle appears to be from the empirical point of view.
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What was the substance of the attitude expressed by Hippocrates in his treatise on The Sacred Disease? He made a sharp denial and an equally terse assertion. Hippocrates denied that epilepsy was a sacred disease; in so doing he asserted the true medical attitude as we have developed it through many centuries, the humanistic attitude which justified the very existence of medicine the therapeutic intent, the need and wish to cure man of his ills. What happened to the essential humanism out of which medicine was born? It remained, of course, the prime-moving psychological force of medicine, but it was of necessity over-shadowed by what some choose to call the purely scientific attitude. The doctor practised medicine in the same manner as any good artisan practised his art; he became either a good technician, like Ambroise Pare, or an excellent investigator, like Vesalius or Albrecht von Haller. Toward the eve of the Renaissance, the accent was so far displaced from man as a human being that the doctor was more interested in tradition and an old authoritative text than in the sick man he saw before him.
That is why-despite the great contributions of Michael Servetus, Vesalius, and even Paracelsus-the medical man, having lost his chief object, man, degenerated into the pedantic poseur at whose expense Moliere later had such a very good time. It was for the same reason that the scholarly, thoughtful doctors, such as Thomas Willis, for instance, in the very act of raising pathology to its greatest scientific heights, became interested more in cadavers than in living men. It is impossible to over-estimate the great contributions to medical science which were made by these generations of workers, but it is equally impossible to over-estimate the great lack of understanding of mental diseases that reigned in medicine. The ancient chasm between medicine and psychiatry has not decreased throughout twenty-four hundred years; in some respects it has even increased, and at certain periods it reached a singular peak of cruelty and bloodshed. It would be quite wrong to repeat the traditional and not very telling explanation that ignorance was responsible for all this cruelty and perversion of man's science. It must not be forgotten that the persecution and execution of witches reached their peak at the very time when Galileo and Newton were making their momentous contributions to the knowledge of nature, when the Accademia del Cimento and the Royal Society were reaching out toward greater and greater scientific heights. Knowledge in and by itself does not humanize man. One of the greatest paradoxes of our historv is that singular contradiction between the deep-seated humanism from which medicine sprang and the not less singular manner in which medicine at certain periods lost man whom it had set itself to salvage from frailty and ills. Evidently something more than the mere knowledge or lack of knowledge of certain facts was responsible for this strange failure of a science which showed so much heroism, such ability for self-sacrifice, such keenness of observation, and such tenacity of effort. Even the wonderful efforts of John Weyer in the sixteenth century did little to awaken medicine to a new orientation. Weyer attempted to resuscitate Hippocratism. He urged his colleagues and the entrenched monks to recall the assertion that mental diseases are natural, organic, and not sacred, supernatural, diseases. This appeal could not result in much more than a revival of Hippocratic humoralism and Galenic neurophysiology. Man in his totality was still to be found or even discovered. This explains why even Paracelsus could advise a certain amount of torture and Ambroise Pare a burning at the stake of the mentally sick.
Humanism in the true sense of the word did not assert itself until the sixteenth century, but even its pressure then could not stop that certain deterioration of human values which gradually pene-trated into the medical profession and therefore into the practice of medicine. At the very height of humanisnm, in the days of Erasmus, of the luminous personality, of Thomas More, and the inspired warmth of Juan Luis Vives, the medical profession, because of its peculiar, purely organic orientation, showed a correspondingly substantial deterioration of humanistic values.
The railleries of Frangois Rabelais, despite their extravagance, reflected in substance the true spirit of the time: the deterioration, the materialistic egotism, the self-assured formalism which then characterized medicine. Rabelais,* it is reported, "was kneeling once at church, before the statue of King Charles VIII. A monk came and said to him, that doubtless he mistook that king's statue for that of some saint; but Rabelais immediately replied; 'I am not so much a monk (blockhead, I mean) as thou thinkest me; nor yet so blind as not to know that I kneel before the representation of King Charles VIII, for whose soul I was praying, because he brought the pox out of Naples into this kingdom, by which means I and other physicians have been considerable gainers.'" Another instructive episode: Rabelais' great protector Cardinal du Bellay became ill, apparenitly with a profound depression, as we would say today. "Several physicians being once assembled to consult about an hypochondriacal humour, which confined Cardinal du Bellay to his bed; they at last resolved that an aperitive (opening) decoction should be prepared, to be frequently taken with some syrup by the patient. Now Rabelais, who was his physician, perhaps not being of their opinion, while the rest of our learned doctors were still discoursing in their scientific jargon, to deserve the large fee, caused a fire to be made in the yard, and on it to be set a kettle full of water, into which he had put as many keys as he could get: and while he was very busy in stirring them about with a 3tick, the doctors coming down, saw him, *and asked what he was doing? 'Following your directions,' replied he. 'How in the name of Galen?' cried one of them. 'You are for something that may be verv aperitive,' returned Rabelais, 'and by Hippocrates, I think you will own that nothing can be more aperitive than keys, unless you would have me send to the arsenal for some pieces of cannon.' This odd fancy, being immediately related to the sick cardinal, set him * "The Life of Rabelais," in The Works of Francis Rabelais, translated by Sir Thomas Urquhart and Motteux. London, H. G. Bohn, 1849, vol. 1, p. 12. into such a fit of laughing, that it helped more to cure him than the prescription; and what made the jest the more pertinent wvas, that keys are made of iron and steel, which with water are the chief ingredients in chalybeate medicines."* III It was the cultural revolution of the Renaissance that aroused man to the awareness of the value of the human personality. Out of this awareness was born a new European; adventurous, self-assertive, rebellious, inquisitive, iconoclastic, daring, and impertinent.
To be a man and to respect the humanness in man became the true if not fully outspoken ideal of European civilization. The spirit of Roger Bacon returned from the thirteenth century armed with the new, sixteenth century weapons of social conscousness. But history and especially ideas move slowly, and only very slowly do they bear fruit. It was not until the whole feudal system began to totter that humanism began to show signs of becoming a true, constructive force in the field of medicine. Toward the end of the eighteenth century the trend of greater respect for the human personality, for the freedom of the individual, and for the social rehabilitation of those who by material or psychological misfortune were derailed from the normal path of life became fully crystallized.
It was at this time that psychiatry seems to have reappeared in full force, as if from the unknown. Again, out of the ranks of the medical profession, as in Ancient Greece, came men who proclaimed that a mentally sick person was really sick and really a person. At first this new trend appeared in England and in France, and here the emphasis was laid primarily on kindness, on philanthropic concern about and friendly care of the mentally ill. The names of the Tukes and the Pinels grace this phase of psychiatry; hospitals were organized, and the "insane" were freed from their chains.
But the true problem of mental illness as a medical problem was still approached in an impersonal way. It still appeared to be a question of humors, anatomical malformations, cerebral accidents, and physiological malfunctions. The texts of Hippocrates and Galen were paraphrased in the light of the greater knowledge of pathological anatomy, but the fundamental attitude remained the same. The physician was still interested in the typical forms and * Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 12, 13. not in the psychological content of mental illness. From this attitude, the direct outgrowth of the old Hippocratic trend, there developed the singular propensity to accumulate endless classifications and pseudo-systematic nosologies-a phenomenon which did not reach its logical conclusion of sterility till the very end of the nineteenth century. Here again we witness the same attempt to salvage the mentally ill from prejudice and superstition, the same endeavor to bring psychiatry into the fold of medicine-and the same fundamental, inner contradiction: the personality of the mentally ill was taken into the fold only to be depersonalized and reduced to purely anatomicophysiological categories.
That the cause of this continued miscarriage of medical intent lay not in lack of knowledge should hardly be doubted; science, philosophy, and technology had made immense strides toward the end of the eighteenth century. The fault lay more with the unreadiness of the cultural atmosphere. Before the true meaning of the human personality could be discovered, and before, as a result of this discovery, the concept of personality could be introduced into psychiatry, it was necessary to have the French Revolution, the Napoleonic conquest of Europe, and the passing of Napoleon. It was necessary to assimilate the ideas of liberty, national and individual. It was necessary thoroughly to absorb into one's consciousness the new value of man which the humanists of the sixteenth century had proclaimed over two hundred years before. The assertion of Heraclitus in the fifth century before Christ, that man is the measure of all thingsa statement forgotten, if it was ever remembered-now began to reacquire a true meaning. It is extremely curious and even puzzling to observe in this connection that the true pre-occupation of psychiatry with the value of the human personality, the true search for a psycho-biological foundation of a medical psychology-the truly humanistic approach to psychiatric problems-took place not in France, nor in England where modern psychiatry was born, but in Germany after the liberation from the mastery of Napoleon. Perhaps this apparent paradox is explained by the fact that Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century tasted the sweetness of the new philosophies of freedom while experiencing the bitter discomfort of Napoleonic invasions; it is impossible to say. There were without doubt many cultural determinants which made the Germany of the time the source of a new and different point of view.
From the days of Georg Stahl (1660-1734) and his disciple Langermann (1768-1832), the old Hippocratic thought of a vital force took on a new and deeper meaning in certain quarters of European medicine. The generations which followed these men broke up into two hostile and constantly warring camps. The camp of the so-called somatologists, who seemed both more numerous and more influential, represented the French Hippocratico-Galenic tradition, while the humanistic, romantic psychologists, few and not so influential in actual life, laid the foundation for a new, more rational and more scientific psychiatry which did not even partially come into its own until the beginning of the twentieth century.
IV
The generation of medical men whom we have in mind was born in the latter part of the eighteenth century. It matured approximately at the time of the Battle of Austerlitz and the meeting of Erfurt and the Battle of Jena, and it lived through the upheavals of the Revolution of 1848. In other words, it was a generation whose personalities were forged in the heat of great political and economic changes, but they were also deeply imbued with the tradition of piety, learning, and contemplative pre-occupation with man, his duties, his opportunities, and his rights. This was the period in Germany which came closest to that period of pietas literata which was characteristic of England before Henry VIII's first divorce, and of Bruges where Erasmus and Vives lived in the early years of the sixteenth century.
This German generation differed considerably from that which had just preceded it. The generation of Heinroth and Reil was more self-willed, more practical, and yet still more interested in the abstract principle of goodness than in the practical problems of right. Heinroth and Reil still felt that mental disease came from evil, from sin; their psychiatry was a mixture of organizational endeavors and theological righteousness. To them man lived and was well only in order to be virtuous. To Groos, Nasse, or Ideler, of the next generation, man lived and was well in order to be free and therefore good. Whatever mistakes these younger men made in the theory or the practice of psychiatry, their greatest contribution lay in the fact that they authoritatively insisted that unless natural sciencesanatomy, pathology, and physiology-were brought together with a true knowledge of man, no medical psychology was possible. In other words, they established the true need for a scientific psychology of man which could be attained only through the synthesis of biology and social sciences. They did not use these contemporary terms, of course. They still spoke of philosophy and of anthropology, the latter having a somewhat more restricted meaning than it has today.
Tradition does not look kindly upon the scientific rOle of these representatives of delayed hunmanism in Germany. They are considered mystics, idealists, philosophers who confused and weakened rather than clarified and strengthened psychological medicine. That this judgment on the part of their successors is not just or historically correct is proved by the fact that in present-day psychiatry, outside the ultraconservative remnants of descriptive systematizers, one finds many an idea of Groos, Nasse, and Ideler, anonymously or under a different name, taken root and empirically workable.
Friedrich Groos (1768-1852) was being prepared for the career of lawyer and philosopher but abandoned law without regret in favor of medicine. He was city physician in Karlsruhe and was the first medical director of the Hospital at Pforzheim, at that time a hospital five hundred years old (founded in 1322) and receiving both medical and psychiatric patients. Groos was a very religious man; his favorite authors were Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. He was dubbed "Thle Philosopher-Physician." It was his orientation rather than any systematic contribution that gives him an honorable place in the history of psychiatry. Perhaps this orientation is best expressed in the title of an artide he published in 1849: "The Road through the Fore-court of Political Liberty to the Temple of Moral Freedom." He pondered the problem of illness, having in mind primarily mental illness. He thought that mental disease, unlike organic disease, was a lack of something, a reduction of activity, a certain form of passivity. Mental health was freedom of the soul (spontaneity of the ego, as we would say today). Passions (affects) were the main causative agents of mental illness.
It is clear that Groos had a definite sense of the value of the human personality, and it was in the detailed study of this personality that he saw the possibility of solving the riddle of mental illness. It is also dear that he should be looked upon not as a philosophizing physician who deviated from medicine as such, but rather as a true physician who was one of the very first to bring into medicine the concept of personality as a whole. He thus reintroduced or returned to psychological medicine the humanistic mainspring from which it had started and which it seemed to have lost under the pressure of a mass of cultural contradictions. Medicine had always valued human life, but unless this value was also extended to the human personality, psychological medicine was destined to remain a stepchild of medicine, or its unwanted and misunderstood appendage. Groos did not speak in these terms, and perhaps he did not even consciously seek such a profound synthesis of medicine and psychiatry, but historically he undoubtedly presented this orientation.
A more articulate effort in this direction was made by his contemporary Friedrich Nasse (1778-1851). Nasse was not a trained psychiatrist. There were none in those days; psychiatry had not yet become a separate medical specialty. But he was a pupil of Reil and was therefore exposed early to psychiatric interests. Nasse appreciated the importance of this branch of medicine for every doctor. He made it his habit to demoinstrate to his medical students a few mental patients daily. He was a good medical man, deeply interested in research and diagnosis. He worked mostly in the hospital at Bonn. He was interested in percussion and devised a special cylinder for that purpose. In his clinic one heard frequently of "cylinder symptoms." He used a special instrument called the thanatometer, a queerly sounding name suggesting the measurement of death. Nasse used the instrument to measure the stomach temperature of the dead and to watch its gradual fall.
One would search in vain for signs of Nasse's deviation from medicine in favor of psychiatry. These two branches were to him parts of the whole of the healing art. As early as 1818 he began publishing his Zeitschrift filr psychische Aerzte, historically the first psychiatric journal. Nasse's responsiveness to the currents of psychiatric thought is reflected in his publications. In 1820 to the name of the Zeitschrift he added mit besonderer Beruicksichtigung des Magnetism-us. In 1823 it became the Zeitschrift far die Anthropologie. Groos published some of his contributions here.
Nasse was not interested in the accumulation of lists of symptoms. He was more concerned with the relationships between symptoms, and was particularly interested in therapy. The Zeitschrift ceased publication in 1826, and by 1830 Nasse began to publish the Jahrbilcher filr Anthropologie and zur Pathologie -und Therapie des Irreveyns. His general medical research was not abandoned, however. In 1835 he issued (in collaboration with his son) his Untersuschungen zur Physiologie und Pathologie, and in 1838 he began, with Jacobi, the Zeitschrift fur die Beurtheilung und Heilung der krankhaften Seelenzustdnde. This term, "pathological mental states," is of more than passing importance. Nasse betrays here a fully modern appreciation of psychiatric problems. He is opposed to classifications, for he considers them artificial; he is interested in the functioning of the personality. He doubts whether one has a right to ascribe mental disease to any special organ. He opposes Gall and Spurzheim and does not believe that the seat of mental diseases is in the brain. It is in the person and not in any anatomical entity. Affects play a serious role in the etiology of mental diseases. To be sure, body organs affect our state of mind and our state of mind affects our body organs. Nasse was the first to introduce the term "psychosomatic" medicine, a term which has gained so much popularity in recent years. He sought to investigate affective reactions and other psychological states of animals; he wished to study the phenomenon of sleep from the psycho-somatic point of view. In other words, he had some sort of intuitive thought about genetic psychology and, finally deviating completely from the Hippocratic-Galenic tradition, he attempted to presernt a unitary picture of man from the standpoint of his total functioning. He thought that affects were mostly inter-related in a recprocal way with the organs of the thorax, while instincts were correspondingly related with the organs of the abdomen.
Nasse might in some respects be considered a representative of traditional, organically oriented medicine who would not, hiowever, accept any psychiatry without psychology and who, following the best tradition of humanism, attempted to weld psychiatry and medicine into one system -of curative endeavor. This he did, not bv way of speculation but by way of correlation of empirical data. To be able even to attempt to do this one had to reach that level of cultural development which not only gave one a sense of the human personality but also the feeling that one may not exclude it from either psychiatry or medicine. In this respect Nasse's younger contemporary Griesinger, who exerted such a great influence on German psychiatry, stands out in great contrast. Griesinger was primarily a pathologist and therefore, despite his great influence and contribution, he remained a formalistic Hippocratist who lost man among man's organs.
Griesinger To him the human personality was a constellation of forces which manifested themselves through various subjective states, primarily through affects. A certain psychological tonus is maintained, an equilibrium; any disturbance in this tonus leads to disease. In other words, whatever the psychological conceptions of Ideler were, and regardless of the fact that they were expressed in the somewhat vague language of the time, Ideler did have a dynamic, psychobiological conception of personality, and he did feel that the doctor, to be a psychiatrist, must be a scientific psychologist of the subjective states of man-a humanistic orientation. Healthy life was psychological tension properly equilibrated. Ideler speaks also of the moral and spiritual freedom of man as a sign of mental health, and the motto for his Die allgenmine Diatetik fiir Gebildete (1846) states: "He who has strength has everything; he who has not, has nothing." Under strength (Kraft) Ideler undoubtedly had in mind the Lebenskraft in Stahl's sense of the word-something akin to the life force, to the elan vital, to the drives of today.
Ideler was the last representative of psychiatric humanism in Germany. From the time of his death German psychiatry almost sharply turned away from the tradition which proved but a tenuous thread in the history of German medical psychology extending from Stahl to Ideler. From the time of Ideler's death till the dose of the century, barring a few exceptions, German psychiatry receded to old, misconceived Hippocratism in modern dress. Wittingly and unwittingly it served the disindividualizing trends of the growing German State and Empire. When, at the beginning of the century, new trends reappeared, trends reminiscent of Nasse and even of Ideler (Gruhle, Kretschmer), they were destined to be but shortlived in Germany. They grew in substance and scientific stature, particularly through the contributions of Bleuler and Freud, until the present crisis divested German psychiatry from any intellectual independence.
It is highly instructive to those who are interested in the general history of our culture to note that the humanistic trends in German psychiatry coincided with the best strivings for true freedom, and of course this is true not of Germany alone.
